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Copyright ©In this paper, I examine the role the firm plays in economizing on information flows that are
required to turn raw materials and ideas into products and services used by final con-
sumers. Specifically, I argue that scale economies associated with complex information
transfers are an important benefit of integration. This argument is distinct from theories
that are based on incentives and leads to different or more refined conclusions in some cases.
The differences are explored in the context of literature on specific assets, vertically related
monopolies, and physical asset ownership. Information flow analysis also arms managers
with a framework for addressing organizational questions beyond firm-boundary decisions
such as intrafirm decisions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.1. INTRODUCTION
Coase (1937) motivates his essay on the firm by
pointing out that ‘Economists in building up a theory
have often omitted to examine the foundations on
which it was erected. This examination is, however,
essential not only to prevent the misunderstanding
and needless controversy which arise from a lack of
knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is
based, but also because of the extreme importance
for economics of good judgment in choosing between
rival sets of assumptions’ (p. 386). His subsequent dis-
cussion of the role of coordination through the market
versus coordination within a firm aimed at remedying
one such omission: an examination of the role and
boundaries of the firm. Beginning with Alchian and
Demsetz (1972), there has been an increasing focus
on what constitutes a firm. However, there is no con-
sensus. Many follow the lead of Jensen and Meckling
(1976) in viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts. Ance to: Ross School of Business, University ofMichigan.
e@umich.edu
2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.alternative definition can be found in the work of
Grossman and Hart (1986) who ‘define the firm as
being composed of the assets (for example, machines,
inventories) that it owns’ (p. 692). Because many con-
tracts can be and are between individuals, not just
physical capital, the former definition addresses hu-
man capital, whereas the latter is limited to physical
capital. Much of the subsequent literature on firm
boundaries can be divided into these two related ques-
tions: (1) what determines the ownership of physical
assets and (2) what determines the organization of hu-
man capital? However, many papers that address these
questions omit a significant examination of a founda-
tion on which they are erected: information flows.
My goal in this paper is to examine the nature of infor-
mation and apply an analysis of its transfer to business
decisions beginning with decisions related to the orga-
nization of human capital. In doing so, I will show that
a number of leading theories on firm boundaries
ultimately rely on information flow analysis. In the
process, I will show how an information flow ap-
proach refines the arguments in ways that can shed
light on some debates in the academic literature and,
INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS 385perhaps more importantly, provide more guidance to
managers.
The organization of human capital is related to and
arguably precedes the question of physical capital:
much of the literature on ownership of physical assets
is based on incentives and thus presupposes an organi-
zation of human capital (people have incentives, phys-
ical assets do not). The importance of being clear
about the distinction between the two approaches to
theory of the firm—human capital versus physical
capital—can be seen in the debate between Coase
and Klein over the GM–Fisher Body merger. Much
of Klein’s (2007) detailed analysis of the GM–Fisher
Body merger at the beginning of the 20th century fo-
cuses on physical assets. In the article that precipitated
the debate, Klein et al. (1978) cited tools and dies as a
source of gains from integration, but after more infor-
mation became available, Klein (2007) determined
that ‘Rather than tools and dies, the long-term exclu-
sive dealing contract can be explained as protecting
the very large expansion in capacity Fisher Body
undertook in 1919 to handle the expected General
Motors business… Fisher Body’s investments in plant
and equipment were not completely GM specific.
However, there was a significant GM-specific element
in these productive assets…’ (p. 5). Thus, although
elsewhere Klein identifies human capital as an impor-
tant factor (e.g., Klein, 1988), he is also interested in
and, in his 2007 article, emphasizes physical capital.
In contrast, Coase (2006) appears to exclude pur-
chases of physical assets from his definition of vertical
integration. In his consideration and then rejection of
what later became known as the asset specificity argu-
ment: ‘I ultimately came to reject the existence of this
risk as an important reason for vertical integration as a
result of discussions I had with businessmen. They
were unimpressed by my argument. They pointed out
that if equipment was required solely for one particular
customer, the cost would normally be reimbursed by
that customer… opportunism in connection with asset
specificity did not normally pose any problem and cer-
tainly not one that would call for vertical integration’
(p. 259). Assuming reimbursement of equipment costs
is accompanied by transfer of ownership of the equip-
ment to the customer,1 Coase does not consider the
purchase of the equipment to be vertical integration.
Instead, Coase is interested in the organization of hu-
man capital. Citing an article by Casadesus-Masanell
and Spulber (2000), Coase says ‘They state that the
merger (between GM and Fisher) was “directed at im-
proving coordination of production and inventories,
assuring GM of adequate supplies of auto bodies,Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.and providing GM with access to the executive talents
of the Fisher brothers” (id). “The executive talents of
the Fisher brothers” were particularly important in
implementing Sloan’s organization reforms in the
1920s. “Sloan requiredmanagers capable of coordinating
complex operations, making decisions in a decentralized
organization, and using common resources effectively”
(id, p. 100)’ (p. 268). Coase is interested in the role of in-
tegration in organizing human capital.
Demsetz (1988) is also interested in the organiza-
tion of human capital and was among the first to high-
light the role of information and knowledge in
determining firm boundaries.2 In particular, he argues
that ‘firm-like’ activities facilitate a specialization in
knowledge. Knowledge can be transferred through ed-
ucation or through lower-cost mechanisms such as di-
rection and transfer of rights to ownership (selling a
finished product is one way to transfer the information
that goes into making the product). Demsetz con-
cludes that ‘the vertical boundaries of the firm are de-
termined by the economics of conservation of
expenditures on knowledge’ (p. 159).
One particular aspect of information flows, which I
refer to as complexity in this paper, plays a central role
in the analysis in the present paper and has received
increased attention more recently. Gant et al. (2002),
for example, point out that ‘unlike other forms of cap-
ital, social capital cannot be traded by individuals on
an open market, but is instead embedded within a
group… (T)he social structure of relationships among
employees provides the infrastructure through which
information and knowledge flow. … these networks
for transmitting information cannot simply be replaced
by operating manuals and standard operating proce-
dures’ (p. 297). Coase’s (2006) emphasis on the man-
agerial capabilities of the Fisher brothers suggests
something similar. Empirical work shows that firms
are the preferred venue for complex information flows,
whereas relatively simple, codifiable information can
flow between firms. Azoulay (2004) examines the
choice of outsourcing Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) tests within the pharmaceutical industry and
finds that when the pharmaceutical company is learn-
ing from the testing process (e.g., because the drug is
part of a newer class of drugs), it is more likely to ver-
tically integrate and conduct the testing itself. How-
ever, when the drug is more similar to existing
drugs, the pharmaceutical company is more likely to
outsource the testing to a CRO. He explains this by ar-
guing that the pharmaceutical company is less likely to
learn anything from the testing in this case and just
wants the tests completed to satisfy the FDA. KogutManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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sponsible for 35 major innovations to determine when
the firm would commercialize the innovation through
a wholly owned subsidiary versus transfer the innova-
tion rights to a separate firm. They find that firms are
more likely to keep the innovation in-house when the
knowledge is less codifiable, has numerous critical
and interacting variables, and requires knowledge that
is costly to teach to another person. Monteverde
(1995) shows that greater levels of unstructured tech-
nical dialog between fabrication and development en-
gineering in the semiconductor industry lead to greater
levels of vertical integration.
In this paper, I use the analysis of Demsetz (1988),
Azoulay (2004), and Kogut and Zander (2003), which
I describe as information flow analysis, and show that
it is at the heart of other lines of literature. Section 2
describes information flow analysis as I use it in this
paper beginning with a discussion of the different
types of information and continuing with an examina-
tion of the information-related costs and benefits of
using firms as a mechanism for transferring complex
information.3 Section 3 applies information flow anal-
ysis to the asset specificity literature arguing that spec-
ificity is often due to and varies with the complexity of
information flows. It also shows where there are dif-
ferences between the two arguments. Section 4 ties in-
formation flow analysis to the ownership of physical
capital. Because much of the literature on physical as-
sets is based on incentives, it is critical to understand
the incentives of the agents acting on behalf of the rest
of the firm’s stakeholders. Thus, analysis of physical
asset ownership depends on an understanding of the
organization of human capital. Two sets of studies
are reviewed in this section to illustrate the point.
Section 5 shows that some of the traditional arguments
for vertical integration including scale economies and
sequential monopolies are incomplete without any
analysis of the information flows.2. INFORMATION FLOWS AND FIRM
BOUNDARIES
Turning raw materials and ideas into products and ser-
vices that can be used by final consumers requires
transferring not only physical goods but also vast
amounts of information between all of the different in-
dividuals involved in the process. Information flow
analysis argues that one important function of a firm is
to economize on this costly activity. This suggests that
bits of information should be the base unit of analysisCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.in understanding the organizational relationships. In a
sense, this is parsing transactions, Williamson’s (1985)
base unit of analysis (and Coase, 1988, p. 4), into finer
components. Williamson’s transaction costs include ex
ante costs such as ‘drafting, negotiating and safe-
guarding an agreement’ (p. 20) and ex post costs such
as maladaptation costs, haggling costs, costs of gover-
ning the transactions, and credible commitment costs.4
Information flow analysis focuses instead on the com-
plexity of the information being transferred across the
different parties in the transaction. This approach al-
lows different components of the transaction costs to
be borne by different entities. For instance, individuals
within firm Amay transact with individuals within firm
B by having firm B employees provide software plan-
ning and development services to firm A. Within that
transaction, however, there are many different interac-
tions between different individuals in the two firms.
What role do the employees of the customer (firm A)
play in the planning and development of the code?
What role do the employees of the software firm (firm
B) play? In some instances, the software developer
(employees of firm B) may be given a basic overall
goal and then sent off to develop the software. In other
instances, the software developer employees may work
on very small iterations, constantly returning to the
employees of the customer for progress reports and
guidance on next steps. Both are transactions, but the
information flows differ significantly between the
two. Understanding the circumstances under which
one is preferable to the other requires an understanding
of the types and timing of information being trans-
ferred. Using information as the base unit of analysis
also differs from the transaction cost approach in that,
like traditional scale economy arguments, it empha-
sizes productive efficiency instead of incentives in
determining firm boundaries, although both play a role.
Both incentives and productivity also play a role
in transaction cost analysis, but the emphasis there is
on incentives.52.1. Complex Information
But what is ‘complex information’? A taxonomy devel-
oped in the 1950s and still widely used today, Bloom’s
taxonomy, illustrates variation in complexity as the term
is used in this paper. Bloom’s taxonomy is the result of
work by Benjamin Bloom (1956) and his colleagues to
develop a hierarchy of educational goals.6 They define
the base level, which they call ‘knowledge’, as the mem-
orization of facts.7 Higher-order thinking is required as
one moves up the taxonomy to comprehension of theManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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synthesis of different concepts and facts, and finally
evaluation or the ability to make judgments. Informa-
tion at the highest level of complexity is costly to trans-
fer. Teaching judgment can take years of repeated
interactions and experiential learning; it is not easily
codifiable. Transferring basic information, knowledge
in Bloom’s parlance, entails few costs: numbers on a
piece of paper will suffice. No personal interaction is
necessary.
Although the language differs, this notion of com-
plexity is consistent with that used in other articles
on information flows. As mentioned, Demsetz uses
the term knowledge instead of information, and Gant
et al. include something that amounts to complex in-
formation flows as part of their description of social
capital. Azoulay (2004) distinguishes between ‘data
production—the routine manipulation, storage and
transfer of symbolic information within established
categories; and knowledge production—the establish-
ment of novel conceptual categories, hypotheses and
causal associations’ (p 1591). Kogut and Zander
(2003) use teachability (the cost of teaching know-
how), codifiability (the degree to which information
can be written down in documents), and complexity
(number of interacting elements in a given activity)
in their study of production of innovations.8 Indeed,
the degree to which information is codifiable is a use-
ful way to think of the degree of complexity.
Complexity as it is used in this paper is, however,
different from other delineations of information types
such as Jensen and Meckling’s (1992) discussion of
general and specific information. Jensen and Meckling
define specific knowledge ‘as knowledge that is costly
to transfer among agents’. To illustrate this point, they
use Hayek’s (1945) example of how to determine
empty space on a freighter. In this case, specific
information about the location and timing of the space
is required; general knowledge such as ‘(a)ggregating
or lumping together items such as location or quality
destroys (the data’s) usefulness’ (p. 4). Other examples
of specific knowledge cited by Jensen and Meckling in-
clude ‘knowledge of specific skills or preferences of in-
dividuals, or the peculiarities of specific machines,
knowledge of particular unemployed resources or in-
ventories, and knowledge of arbitrage opportunities’
(p. 6). Like complex information, specific knowledge
is costly to transfer; however, in the examples described
earlier, transfers are costly because vast quantities of
simple information are being transferred, not because
complex information is transferred. This difference be-
tween complex information and specific information isCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.important. Complex information can be received by a
given individual and usefully aggregated. That is, al-
though specific pieces of information may not be
recalled, the individual can recall the combination of
lessons learned from complex information flows in a
way that is useful to the individual. By contrast, and
as Jensen and Meckling point out, the large volume of
simple information described by Jensen and Meckling
as specific (e.g., data on capacity utilization) cannot be
aggregated in a way that is useful to a single individual.
2.2. Costs and Benefits of Internalizing
Information Flows
This section describes some of the main costs and
benefits of organizing within a firm as they relate to in-
formation flows. Other costs and benefits, including
many related to incentives, are not discussed here.
This does not mean that these other costs and benefits
are unimportant. The point of this discussion is to
highlight some information-related costs and benefits
that should be included (along with the other costs
and benefits) in decisions about firm boundaries.
2.2.1 Benefits
The central argument of information flow analysis
is that one of the principal benefits of operating within
a firm is the efficiency with which the individuals in
the firm transfer complex information. This argument
rests on three conditions: (1) employment increases
the likelihood that a given individual is going to be in-
volved in repeated transfers of complex information;
(2) information-sharing costs will be higher when the
information being transferred is more complex; and
(3) there are scale economies to transfer complex in-
formation. Consider the plausibility of each.
Employment could increase the likelihood that a
given individual is involved in repeated interactions
either because employment gives the owners more
control over who is involved in information transfers
or because employment represents a credible commit-
ment to employees. Owners will have more control
over which individuals are involved in information
transfers when the individual is an employee than
when the individual works for an independent contrac-
tor. Azoulay (2004) found that independent contract
research organizations (CROs) would sometimes sub-
stitute which individuals were interacting with the
pharmaceutical company to the detriment of the phar-
maceutical company. Employees at pharmaceutical
companies therefore preferred integration into FDA
testing when they valued controlling the choice of in-
dividuals involved in the FDA testing. EmploymentManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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term relationship between the owner(s) and individ-
uals employed at the firm. Firm owners could try to
commit to independent contractors in a similar way.
However, there seems to be some sense among em-
ployees and employers alike that there is a greater
commitment through employment. Part of that may
be legal (Masten, 1988), but part goes beyond the
law.9
The second condition—the cost of transferring in-
formation increases as the complexity increases—
holds because complex information is not easily trans-
ferred through simple written documents or emails.
Complex information transfers typically require itera-
tive personal interactions. For instance, teaching an
employee how to interact with different customers
can require experience interacting with the customers
in the presence of both the teacher and the student. It
may not be possible to anticipate all circumstances
that will arise, and thus, the teacher must convey a
sense of judgment to the student. The information be-
ing transferred in this case is highly complex: the abil-
ity to judge how to interact in multiple situations,
some of which cannot be anticipated. Because teach-
ing judgment requires so much interpersonal interac-
tion, it is very costly.
The third condition—scale economies in transfer-
ring complex information—means that repeated inter-
actions economize on the amount of information that
needs to be exchanged. As the number of complex in-
formation exchanges increases between two individ-
uals, both individuals develop a stock of information
that can be used in all future exchanges.10 For in-
stance, teaching judgment the first time is very costly.
However, once taught, that ability to make judgments
exists and can be drawn on for future interactions.11
This is why teams in sports or in business that are
composed of individuals who have worked with each
other over a long period can be much more efficient
than teams recently combined even if the latter is com-
posed of all stars and the former is not.
The claim of this paper is that the magnitude of the
benefit of conducting economic activity within a
firm’s boundaries is an increasing function of the in-
teraction of complexity of information transfers and
the number of times these transfers take place. The lat-
ter can be further divided into frequency and duration
of the transfers. To see the importance of the interac-
tion between frequency, duration, and complexity,
consider some examples that include two of the com-
ponents, but not all three. The relationship between
general construction contractors and a subcontractorCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.requires frequent transfers of information and some-
times for long periods (the two may work together on
multiple projects over a number of years). However,
the information is simple—telling an electrician what
day to show up and providing blueprints—and there-
fore relatively costs little to transfer. Consequently,
subcontractors are not employees of the general con-
tractor. Consulting firms exchange complex informa-
tion with clients and may do so frequently, but only
for the duration of the consulting project. The consult-
ing firm generally remains separate from the client.12
Accountants may work with a firm for years exchang-
ing somewhat complex information for tax and other
accounting purposes but do so infrequently. They often
operate as an external advisor to the firm.
In addition to the central benefit of information
flow analysis described earlier—economizing on com-
plex information transfers—there is a second informa-
tion-related benefit to integrating. Integration can
resolve common agency problems: agents within a
firm may have more incentive to share the information
than agents between firms do.13 For example, in the
pharmaceutical industry, there are a limited number
of vendors (external suppliers) that store and ship
chemicals, vaccines, and biologics to the research de-
partments at major pharmaceutical companies. The
costs of shipping and storing these supplies have led
staff at some firms to engage in major cost reduction
initiatives, initiatives that often involve employees of
both the vendor and the pharmaceutical company.
However, employees within each vendor may be re-
luctant to share the information with employees within
the pharmaceutical companies for two reasons. First,
any cost reductions that an employee of a vendor
(V1) discovers and shares with employees of the phar-
maceutical company may be shared with employees of
the pharmaceutical company’s other vendors (V1’s
competitors) in an effort to reduce supply chain costs
across all vendors. Second, an employee of a vendor
(V1) who knows how to reduce costs because of work
with a pharmaceutical company (P1) may be reluctant
to reveal it to employees of another pharmaceutical
company (P2) out of fear that P2 will view that as an
indication that V1 is not trustworthy. That is, P2 may
view the sharing of P1’s cost reductions as a breach
of trust (company secrets) between V1 and P1 and
therefore be concerned that some of their own (P2’s)
secrets are being shared with their competitors. P2
may therefore be less willing to work with V1.
2.2.2 Costs of Internalizing Information Flows
The first, and arguably most important, cost of inte-
gration is the principal–agent problem. This is discussedManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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discussed further here,14 but one form this may take
is particularly important in the present context (and
will be used in further discussion later): a reduction
in effort to engage in a costly exchange of complex in-
formation with parties outside of the newly integrated
firm. Consider a vertically related set of independent
firms: supplier Z, manufacturer Y, and retailer X. If
supplier Z merges with manufacturer Y, this may im-
prove the efficiency of information sharing between
employees of Z and Y (as described earlier), but it
may reduce the efficiency of information sharing be-
tween the employees of the newly merged firm, ZY,
and employees of retailer X relative to the interaction
between employees of X and employees of Y that
took place before the merger. To the extent that em-
ployees at ZY are now more insulated from the disci-
pline of the market, they will have less incentive to
invest in costly exchange of complex information.
The same holds true if Z and Y are horizontally related
as long as the merger increases the principal–agent
problem by decreasing the effect of market discipline
on employee’s behavior.
Second, employees within a firm may have less ac-
cess to market information after integration. This is
distinct from the cost described earlier in that the prin-
cipal–agent problem describes lack of effort by em-
ployees within the firm to gather information. This
second cost relates to information available to them.
Even if employees exert the same amount of effort af-
ter the merger to gather information, they may have
access to less either because employees higher up the
hierarchy fail to share the relevant information or
because there are more costs associated with gaining
access to the relevant information.
Third, in order to gain the benefits of economizing
on complex information flows, significant upfront
costs are incurred in the form of information accumu-
lation. It takes time and effort to gain the stock of in-
formation that allows a firm to operate efficiently.
Finally, firm leadership can become overwhelmed
with the amount of information needed to operate
efficiently, a component of the textbook example of
increased management costs (e.g., Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 2013, p. 255). The larger the firm, the
greater the amount of information flowing to the firm
and the more likely the leadership will have to rely
on employees other than themselves to generate
information (Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994). This in-
troduces a need for mechanisms to share the infor-
mation between the different employees, thereby
increasing the cost.Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.2.3. Information Flows and Interactions with
Individual Customers
A focus on firm boundaries can conceal information
transfers between a firm and its individual customers.
Yet, if one of the central roles of organizational forms
is to economize on the information flows needed to
transform natural resources and ideas into products
and services usable to customers, the interaction
between the final customer and the retailing firm is im-
portant. Information flow analysis may reveal benefits
to frequent, complex information transfers between
the final consumer and the retailer, but integration is
typically not an option with an individual consumer.15
How is this best handled by the organization?
Although the integration of retailer X with the con-
sumer is not possible, manufacturer Y does have a
choice about integrating with retailer X. Following
the logic described earlier on the incentive cost of in-
ternalizing economic activity, an increase in the bene-
fits of close interactions between the employees of the
retailer and the individual customer increases the costs
of reduced effort that results when manufacturer Y in-
tegrates with retailer X.16 Thus, information flow anal-
ysis suggests that integration of X and Y will be less
beneficial as the amount and complexity of informa-
tion transfers between the final consumer and the
retailer increases.3. INFORMATION FLOWS AND SPECIFIC
INVESTMENTS
Information flow analysis is distinct from some of the
more widely accepted theories of the firm. Often, the
distinction is in the emphasis on the cost of transfer-
ring information instead of incentives. The remaining
sections explore other theories and show that, in some
cases, these theories by themselves do not explain
when it is beneficial to integrate.17 An understanding
of the complexity and timing of information flows is
also required. In other instances, the conclusions that
result from information flow analysis can differ from
those of other theories. Because of its prominence in
theory of the firm literature, I begin with and examine
in some detail the literature on asset specificity.
3.1. Opportunism and Specific Investments
Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1979, 1985) ar-
gued that intrafirm transactions reduce opportunism
on specific investments. This theory has played a
prominent role in the literature on firm boundariesManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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Crawford, and Alchian use the example of a printing
press that is leased to publisher B by printer A. The cost
of providing the service is $4000 in fixed costs and
$1500 in variable costs. If publisher B does not use
it, publisher C is willing to pay the next highest amount
at $3500 (which, by assumption, exceeds the salvage
value). Publisher B might have been willing, ex ante,
to pay the $5500 needed to allow printer A to break
even. However, once the investment is made, publisher
B could decrease the price it pays to printer A to as low
as $3500, and printer A’s most profitable response will
be to accept that despite the fact that it does not cover
the costs incurred. Realizing this possibility upfront,
printer A would ask for some sort of assurance that this
will not happen. That assurance can be contractual
(e.g., a forfeitable bond of $2000, which goes to printer
A in the event that publisher B changes the terms), or it
can take the form of vertical integration (i.e., A buying
B or vice versa).
The benefit of integration, under the asset specific-
ity argument, is that it eliminates the concern printer A
has about receiving its return once the investment is
made. There are two reasons for printer A to be
concerned. The first, and the focus of most of the liter-
ature on opportunism, is duplicity on the part of pub-
lisher B: once printer A has made the investment,
publisher B could take advantage of printer A by of-
fering to pay a much lower price than was initially
agreed upon. The second reason is differing expecta-
tions of the future. Publisher B wants to use printer
A because publisher B believes the demand for its
product will be sufficient to cover the costs of printer
A and all other costs publisher B incurs. Printer A
might not agree with publisher B’s assessment about
the future demand for publisher B’s product. Yet, to
the extent that printer A’s compensation is based on
the amount of printing (in the extreme, publisher B
may go bankrupt because of lack of demand, leaving
printer A with zero compensation), printer A would in-
cur some of the cost of an incorrect assessment of fu-
ture demand. Whether the concerns are related to
duplicity or differing expectations, integration of pub-
lisher B with printer A solves the problem.3.2. Opportunism and Complex Information
There are at least two alternative solutions, however.
First, publisher B could buy the printing equipment
rather than leasing it from an independent firm. This will
solve both the duplicity and the differing expectations
problem. However, this will only be a cost-effectiveCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.alternative if publisher B is as efficient at deploying
the printing assets as printer A is, a condition that is less
likely the more complex the information needed to effi-
ciently use the printing assets. For example, printer A
may more efficiently process the information necessary
to monitor and maintain the equipment. Printer A may
have in-depth knowledge about how the printer works,
when a different printer would be optimal for the needs
of that particular customer, and so on. If publisher B
buys the printing equipment, publisher B would be re-
quired to learn all of this. This learning may be a com-
plex information flow making the form of integration
considered here (publisher B buying its own printer) a
costly solution when compared with buying printing
services on the market.
A second possibility is for publisher B to sell to
printer A the information about publishing that makes
the investment profitable. The information would be
about both how to produce the final product and why
the investment is profitable. Selling the information
would address the duplicity problem because the
investment could no longer be expropriated by the em-
ployees of publisher B; the rights to the information
have been transferred. If all of the other elements of
production are readily available in the market, pub-
lisher B need not even be involved anymore, much
less have any ability to ‘hold up’ printer A. Differing
expectations can also be addressed by information
transfers. The reason the leadership of publisher B
wants the investment made is because it believes it
can earn a return on the investment in the printing
equipment. This is based on information it has about
the costs of production and about publisher B’s market
demand. Publisher B just needs printer A to supply
some component (the printer). However, if the leader-
ship of printer A has the same information that the lead-
ership of publisher B has, printer A’s leadership would
understand the value of the investment and be just as
willing to make the investment. The problem is that
transferring this information can be extremely costly.
Note that the differences in these solutions are not
in the physical assets. The physical assets are owned
and used by a single party whether it is through inte-
gration of publisher B and printer A, publisher B sell-
ing the information about the idea to printer A, or
publisher B just buying the equipment in the first
place. The difference is in the organizational relation-
ships between the individuals involved in the produc-
tion. With integration, the employees in publisher B
and printer A are working together within one organi-
zational unit: the firm. With the other two options, the
employees remain in separate firms.19Manage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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Information Flow Analysis
The implications of these alternative solutions for the
organization of human capital are similar to those of
the opportunism literature, but there are differences.
Because investments that are not specific to a particu-
lar firm have a clear market value, there is no need to
transfer information about the production process or
about the potential market returns on the investment:
the investor has other alternatives should the original
buyer renege. Thus, when specificity is absent, com-
plex transfers are likely to be unnecessary, and market
transactions are sufficient. However, for specific
investments, the decision makers at the supplier asked
to make the investment (printer A in the preceding
example) will have to be convinced that it will be able
to realize a return. These decision makers could be
convinced by being educated on both the process
and the market potential, or they could be ‘convinced’
by being purchased.20 The greater the cost of transfer-
ring the information, the more likely the second alter-
native—vertical integration—will be the optimal
contracting choice. Thus, predictions from complex
information flow analysis are likely to be similar to
those derived from asset specificity arguments.
However, there is a difference between the two theories:
information flow analysis is motivated by the efficiency
of economizing on information transfers (integration
lowers the cost of repeated complex information trans-
fers), whereas specificity is motivated by incentives.
This difference leads to different predictions whenever:
(i) the information transferred is simple, but the invest-
ments required are specific; or (ii) the information trans-
ferred is complex, but the investments required are not
specific.
An example of simple information transfers but
specific investments can be found in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. Small start-up firms often develop ideas
and take them to the preclinical stage, or somewhere
further down the path of phase I, II, or III of the trials
before selling the rights to a larger company. The
larger company completes the clinical trials and, if
successful, takes care of production, distribution, and
marketing of the product. To do so, the larger
company must make investments in FDA trials, the
marketing, and the distribution of the product, which
are specific to the product. The opportunism literature
predicts that the firms would integrate because of the
specific nature of the investments.21 However, this is
often not the contract of choice. Instead, and consis-
tent with information flow analysis, employees fromCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the smaller firm often transfer information about the
product, probability of success, and the potential value
of success to the employees of the larger firm (includ-
ing the decision makers). Information about the
product or production process is often very simple in-
formation. The chemical composition or the specific
protocol for producing must be documented for the
FDA, and often, these documents are sufficient to
convey the information a third party would need to
produce it. Information about the probability of clini-
cal success is often specific to the particular genes or
molecules being studied. The smaller firm may have
a scientist who has more information about that;
however, to the extent that it is based on accepted
science, the buyer is likely to have its own scientists
who are able to develop their own conclusions at a rel-
atively low cost. Further, the smaller firm’s scientists
can transfer that information by investing in the
upfront trials and proving—using third party standards
(the FDA)—that the product is likely to succeed. The
further along the FDA approval process path, the more
likely it is to succeed. The smaller firm’s employees
may also put together some sort of market analysis,
making the case that further investment in the drug is
warranted. Rather than vertically integrating, these
smaller firms often sell the relevant information to
the larger firms through contracts that transfer (at least
some of the) rights to the information to the larger
company. Some options, such as licensing contracts,
distribute the profits from success and require an on-
going working relationship between the small start-
up employees and the larger distributor’s employees
in a way that bears certain similarities to integration
and is more in line with Williamson’s (1991) hybrid
form of governance. Other options involve one-time
payments and are less like integration. In contrast to
the asset specificity argument, the complex-informa-
tion-flows approach predicts that the degree to which
the contract resembles integration will be a function
of the complexity of information: as the number of
complex information transfers increases, the benefits
of integration increase. In this case, the information
transfers are simple, and information flow analysis
predicts that across-firm transactions are more likely.
Because in all cases, appropriable specific investments
are required, the asset specificity argument predicts
that integration (or some contracting arrangement that
closely resembles integration) would be the more
likely solution in all cases.
This difference in predictions between the asset
specificity argument and information flow analysis
also holds for specific investments in human capital.Manage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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semblers will vertically integrate when the production
process, broadly defined, generates specialized, non-
patentable know-how. When production processes
are of this kind, both assembler and supplier are ex-
posed to the possibility of opportunistic recontracting’
(p. 206). Because human capital cannot be owned, the
human capital specificity argument is related to orga-
nizational issues just as information flow analysis is:
specific human capital is more likely to be employed
within the firm. However, the same differences be-
tween information flow analysis and human capital
specificity described earlier hold here.22 Specifically,
information flow analysis suggests that specificity is
not enough; the information to be transferred must also
be sufficiently complex. For example, a consulting firm
may engage in a significant amount of research that is
specific to a particular client, research that generates
‘nonpatentable know-how’. The individuals within
the consulting firm have thus made investments in hu-
man capital that are specific to the client. However,
conveying the results of the research may involve only
simple information flows such as a report or presenta-
tion and the research may be of a limited duration,
thereby reducing the benefits of integration. Azoulay’s
(2004) analysis of CROs is a good example of this. The
investments in human capital made by anyone testing a
particular drug are specific to that drug. When the phar-
maceutical company is interested in learning from the
results, the information flows are complex, and
Azoulay finds that the research is more likely to be
conducted by the pharmaceutical company’s own em-
ployees. However, if the pharmaceutical company is
only interested in data on the efficacy and safety of
the drug, the information is simple and, he finds, more
likely to be transferred across the market from an inde-
pendent CRO’s employees to the pharmaceutical
company’s employees. In contrast, the opportunism lit-
erature emphasizes the appropriability of the specific
investment, regardless of the complexity of the infor-
mation being transferred and reasons that specific
human capital will be employed within the firm.
The emphasis on production efficiency as opposed
to incentives has further implications for information
flow analysis that are not found in the asset specificity
arguments. First, information flow analysis suggests
something about which party will buy and which will
sell in an acquisition. Specifically, the party that con-
trols the more complex information is more likely to
end up owning the merged entity. This is due to the
cost of transferring the information. Economizing on
information flows suggests that whichever party hasCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the least complex information will transfer it to the
party with the most complex information, thereby sav-
ing the cost of transferring the most complex informa-
tion. Incentive alignment suggests that because the
party that began with the most complex information
is now in possession and control of all of the relevant
information, it would also be beneficial to have that
party own residual rights to the information. The op-
portunism literature is silent on this point.23
Second, risk preferences play a role in information
flow analysis. Williamson (1985) deliberately avoids
relying on risk aversion in part because it ‘deflects at-
tention from core efficiency purposes’ (p. 390). This is
true here as well, but because information flow analy-
sis centers on transfers between individuals, the role of
risk aversion is difficult to avoid. To see how it im-
pacts the analysis, return to the printer and publisher.
Even if publisher B sells the information to printer A
and that transfer takes place at a sufficiently low cost
so that both have the same assessment of the likely
outcomes and their payoffs, printer A’s leadership
may not choose to make the investment simply be-
cause it is risk averse. Instead, printer A’s leadership
may choose to allow printer A to be purchased by pub-
lisher B even though the cost of that approach exceeds
the cost of transferring the information. That is, the
cost of the (simple) information transfer is less than
the cost of integrating, but the cost of the risk (risk pre-
mium) plus the cost of the information transfer may
exceed the cost of integrating.244. INFORMATION FLOWS AND PHYSICAL
ASSETS
Ownership of physical assets is related to information
flow analysis directly and indirectly. The direct effect
is related to information flows that are tied to a physi-
cal asset. When frequent, complex information trans-
fers require the use of a particular piece of physical
capital, that physical capital becomes part of the calcu-
lus that goes into determining firm boundaries in terms
of human capital. Returning to the printing equipment
example, if the equipment requires accumulation of
complex information by those who work with the
equipment, individuals would gradually develop a
stock of information related to the equipment that
would make it beneficial to include all of those indi-
viduals within the firm boundary with the capital
equipment. Thus, even if there are no information
transfers between the employees, it would be benefi-
cial to include all of those individuals within the sameManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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The equipment links the employees together.
The indirect effect is due to emphasis on incentives
in determining ownership of physical capital. The last
section described the asset specificity argument where
the incentive to expropriate quasi-rents associated with
specific investments gives rise to integration. In the
property rights literature (Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Hart, 1988), incentives associated with ex post returns
drive decisions about asset ownership ex ante. Moral
hazard literature emphasizes the incentive costs for
the principal. But firms do not have incentives, people
do. Actions taken by firms are actions of the individ-
uals working within the firm, individuals who are un-
likely to have the same incentives of other individuals
working within that firm (other employees) or, per-
haps more importantly, other stakeholders in the firm
(for example, shareholders). Thus, analysis of the
boundaries of physical capital requires an understand-
ing of the organization and incentives of the individ-
uals who decide how the physical capital is deployed.
Not all of the literature on physical capital exam-
ines the underlying incentives of the individuals. For
a number of important articles, because they focus
on ownership of physical assets, the incentives of indi-
viduals within the firm are assumed to be consistent
with the firm’s ownership; however, it is not clear that
assumption is valid. For example, Forbes and
Lederman (2010) explore the ownership patterns of re-
gional airlines, some of which are owned by major
carriers. Their argument centers on unscheduled inter-
ruptions in service that cannot be anticipated (e.g.,
weather cancellations). They argue that ‘integration
may allow a major (carrier) to more efficiently respond
to the schedule disruption by improving its access to
resources that had been allocated to the regional’
(p. 770). But the owned regional is not making the de-
cision; an employee at the owned regional is. Thus, the
relevant question is whether the employee at an owned
regional has more of an incentive to efficiently re-
spond to a schedule disruption than an employee
within an independent regional. The answer to that de-
pends on the specific contract written in each case.
Later in the article, they address the possibility that
the independent regional could have a contract that
gave its employees incentives to account for costs of
delays and cancellations on the major; however, they
continue to talk about the independent regional rather
than the employee of the independent regional. The
problem with this is that it masks the problem the ma-
jor-owned regional faces: how to generate the right in-
centives for its employees to make the decisions thatCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.account for the major carrier’s costs and benefits.
Because employees are making the decisions, some
sort of mechanism must be developed that gives the
employee the appropriate incentives. That is true
whether it is an employee of the major-owned regional
or an employee of an independent regional.25 Thus, it
is unclear that simply owning a regional carrier is the
most cost-effective method of addressing the
challenges a major faces in the event of unforeseeable
circumstances such as weather cancellations.
In another example, Baker and Hubbard (2003)
examine the ownership patterns of trucks. Some
trucks are owned by shippers (companies that pro-
duce products that need to be shipped to different
locations) and some are owned by carriers (compa-
nies that own fleets of trucks and sell their services
to shippers). One of the challenges in owning a
truck is keeping it full on all legs of a trip. A ship-
per may need a product shipped from points A to
B, but the owner of the truck would like to gener-
ate revenue from a backhaul (shipments from points
B to A) as well. Because carriers own many trucks,
Baker and Hubbard argue that they will have a
stronger incentive to find a backhaul than a shipper
even though a shipper can contract with a broker
who may interact with many other shippers, indepen-
dent truck owners, and carriers. Part of their argument
rests on the assertion that brokers (intermediaries be-
tween shippers and carriers) ‘have weaker incentives
(than carriers) to find particularly good matches, be-
cause they do not own trucks and are thus less able
to appropriate as large a share of the value they create’
(p. 556). However, this is only true if the individual
employee of the carrier who is coordinating truck
schedules is also the owner. If the individual who is
actually doing the coordinating is an employee of a
carrier company, which is likely in most cases, the
question is whether the incentives of the employee
at the carrier are stronger than the incentives of an em-
ployee at the broker. Again, when we get down to the
individual employees, the incentives are less clear.
Both of the preceding studies present evidence that
is consistent with their incentive-based arguments.
However, the observed relationships are also consis-
tent with other hypotheses including those that are de-
rived from information flow analysis. Incentive
arguments are correlated with information flow analy-
sis because moral hazard problems are greater when
the ability to observe behavior is weaker. When the in-
ability to observe behavior is due to complex informa-
tion flows, the two frameworks yield empirically
equivalent outcomes. This can be seen by consideringManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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trucking industry organizational relationships.
In the airline industry, although information about
the weather itself is simple information, the informa-
tion transfers required as a result of weather cancel-
ations require many real-time interactions between
numerous employees, which are often complex.
Which employees to shift to which activities will de-
pend on the specific circumstances related to the flight,
the day, the weather, and so on. Similarly, which as-
sets to use, which flights to delay, and which em-
ployees have the relevant information—all of this
will be specific to the particular circumstance. One of
the key arguments of this paper is that organizing eco-
nomic activity within a firm economizes on transfers
of complex information. Specifically, in this example,
when the individuals from the major carrier and the re-
gional carrier that interact in the event of a weather
event at an airport are the same individuals that have
interacted in numerous other weather events, informa-
tion flow analysis suggests that complex information
will be transferred more efficiently than if they
interacted less frequently. Integration can increase
the likelihood that the same individuals at the regional
carrier and the major carrier are involved because of
the following: (i) integration represents a credible
commitment to the individuals at the regional carrier
by the owners of the major carrier and/or (ii) integra-
tion gives the owners of the major carrier more control
over which individuals at the regional carrier are man-
aging the weather event. Under these circumstances,
integration will be a more efficient solution owing to
a more efficient transfer of complex information. That
is, as Forbes and Lederman argue, an increase in
unforeseeable circumstances such as weather changes
will be handled more economically through vertical
integration. However, the benefit of integrating using
information flow analysis does not rely on an incentive
argument; instead, it is related to the increased produc-
tivity due to complex information flows (holding in-
centives constant).
Good fits for backhauls in the trucking industry re-
quires that dispatchers know about the trucks as well
as the truck drivers. In one of the interviews I
conducted, a carrier employee said that drivers have
individual characteristics such as where they like to
drive and how they interact with customers (both ship-
pers and receivers). These are unique to each driver.
Some shippers or receivers also have very specific ex-
pectations. Dispatchers can use this knowledge to try
to ensure a good match between driver and shipper
or driver and receiver. However, developing theCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.knowledge in the first place requires repeated interac-
tions. Thus, integration of driver with dispatcher may
be beneficial in arranging backhauls because of infor-
mation complexity.265. INFORMATION FLOWS AND OTHER
ECONOMIC THEORIES ON FIRM
BOUNDARIES
Information flow analysis can also be used to augment
other efficiency arguments related tofirm boundaries such
as scale economies and vertically related monopolies.
5.1. Scale Economies
In 1997, the US Antitrust Merger Guidelines were re-
vised to explicitly account for efficiencies such as
scale economies. Some authors have pointed out that
scale economies can be realized unilaterally, thereby
raising questions about their use as a defense in a
merger investigation (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro,
2001). A more general question is whether scale econ-
omies can be realized between firms. In some cases,
they can be. In such cases, whether or not efficiencies
from scale economies require conducting the activity
within a firm’s boundaries can depend on the com-
plexity of the information transfers—scale economies
are not the determining factor. Two examples illustrate
this point.
Consider large investments in plant and equipment.
The owner of a manufacturing plant may benefit from
employing many people because the use of the equip-
ment and coordination of the activity require relatively
frequent and complex information exchanges. An of-
fice building, however, might be filled with no one
who works for the owner of the building. The office
building’s equipment does not require complex infor-
mation to be transferred, and there is little need to co-
ordinate. Thus, although scale economies in physical
assets may involve significant capital investments, ef-
ficiency does not necessarily require that the investing
firm’s employees utilize the assets. Scale economies
can be realized even when the users of the asset are
not integrated with the owners of the asset. Scale econ-
omies can be realized more efficiently within a firm’s
boundaries when they are combined with frequent
and complex information flows.
Financial scale economies derive from economiz-
ing on borrowing. The argument is that it is cheaper
for a large corporation to borrow money from a finan-
cial institution (or the market) and then allocate fundsManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS 395internally on the basis of its own criteria. It is true that
there are fixed costs associated with ensuring that a
loan is worth making. These costs will reduce the
per-dollar charge of a large loan relative to the charge
of a number of small loans that sum to the value of the
large loan. However, the cost of dealing with many
small loans must be incurred either by a bank or by a
larger, parent firm making a loan to an internal client
(subsidiary). It will be more efficient for the bank to
make the loan to the parent company and have the par-
ent company distribute the investment to its smaller
subsidiaries only when the parent firm is more effi-
cient at determining the credit worthiness of a particu-
lar investment at one of its subsidiaries than a bank
would be. When will that happen? When there are
complex information flows between the smaller enti-
ties and the larger, parent firm, enabling the parent
firm to assess the smaller entities’ credit worthiness
at a cost that is lower than the cost to the bank of de-
veloping a similar assessment.5.2. Hierarchies
In a series of studies, Garicano et al. (Garicano, 2000;
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Garicano and
Santos, 2004; Garicano and Hubbard, 2003, 2005)
also focus on human capital, arguing that organiza-
tions are beneficial as hierarchies that allow those with
specialized human capital to spend more of their time
on the problems or opportunities in which they spe-
cialize. Garicano (2000) identifies different levels of
employees: production workers and multiple levels
of problem solvers. Production workers handle the
most frequent (or easiest) problems. Problems they
cannot solve are referred to the first level of problem
solvers who handle the next most frequent (or next
level of difficulty) problems. Each subsequent level
of problem solver handles increasingly less frequent
(or more difficult) problems with increasing degrees
of specialization. The result is a pyramidal hierarchy
with the smallest group at the top being most special-
ized, handling the least frequent (or most difficult)
problems.
In an extension of Garicano (2000), Garicano and
Santos (2004) contend that a major role of the firm
‘is to match opportunities with talent’ (p. 499), which
happens when less skilled labor refers the more diffi-
cult problems to the next level up in the hierarchy.
They show that when the more capable individual is
the one who knows of an opportunity, there is a spot
contract that will encourage referring the opportunity
to the less capable when it is efficient to do so.Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.However, when the less capable is the one who be-
comes aware of the opportunity, there is not a spot
contract that will result in efficient referral; the less ca-
pable individual has an incentive to hold on to the op-
portunity even though he knows he is less qualified
than the more capable individual. Partnerships can
solve this incentive problem by committing both
agents to income sharing ex ante and thus diminishing
the incentives of the less capable to hold onto an op-
portunity instead of referring it. Garicano and Hubbard
(2003) extend the partnership idea to firm boundaries,
where firm boundaries are defined as ‘the scope of
revenue-sharing arrangements across individuals’
(p. 496).
Like information flow analysis, the hierarchy argu-
ment also relies on costly information transfers and is,
thus, consistent with information flow analysis in
some respects. The benefit of transacting within a
firm’s boundaries, according to the hierarchy argu-
ment, is incentive alignment. The hierarchy argument
holds because it is costly to transfer information about
effort by the agent receiving the problem: ‘Since the
effort that an agent puts into dealing with a particular
opportunity is unobservable, the agent who is referred
an opportunity and obtains only a share of the output
has an incentive to free ride by providing too little ef-
fort’ (Garicano and Santos, 2004, p. 500). This may
overstate the case—output can be a good proxy for ef-
fort in some cases; however, the point is well taken.
Monitoring effort is more difficult in many cases.
For instance, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) base their
argument on the difficulty in monitoring effort when
production requires teamwork. Monitoring individual
effort in a team setting may be more difficult (costly)
because the information is more complex. Monitoring
requires reviewing information based on an under-
standing of the task and the process instead of simple
outputs. To the extent that is true, the hierarchy argu-
ment is also based on complex information: the more
complex the information required to effectively moni-
tor effort, the greater the incentive-alignment benefit
to sharing revenues, that is, organizing within a firm.
Unlike information flow analysis, the unit of analy-
sis in hierarchy analysis is the agent; in information
flow analysis, the unit of analysis is the information.
Consequently, information flow analysis includes ben-
efits to organizing within a firm that are not contem-
plated in hierarchy analysis.27 In hierarchy analysis,
heterogeneous agents transfer problems through a hi-
erarchy until they reach an agent who can address
the problem. Problems are separable, with each part
addressed by a different individual. Team effort onlyManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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transferring opportunities from one level to another.
Problems are not solved through joint effort of multi-
ple individuals. Problems are not interdependent. In-
formation flow analysis, by contrast, emphasizes the
varying complexity of the information transferring be-
tween agents, much of which may be transferred as
part of addressing challenges and opportunities that
are not separable and benefit from input of multiple
agents. Thus, information flow analysis complements
hierarchy analysis: hierarchy analysis focuses on het-
erogeneity of agents and the benefits of transferring in-
formation about opportunities (and challenges) from
one agent to another while information flow analysis
provides a more detailed description of the type of in-
formation that is transferred, allowing analysis on a
transfer-by-transfer basis.
There are a few empirical studies on hierarchies
that are also relevant for information flow analysis.
First, Garicano and Hubbard (2005) investigate the re-
lationship between law firm partners and law firm as-
sociates. They hypothesize that managers with
greater cognitive capacity will benefit more from asso-
ciates with greater cognitive capacity because it allows
the partner to ‘better leverage his talent’ (p. 356).
Their findings support their hypothesis: partners in
law firms are more likely to hire associates who come
from the same-tier school. That is, if the partner is
from a top-tier school, it is more likely that the associ-
ate is from a top-tier school as well. Similarly, partners
within a law firm are more likely to be from the same
tier as other partners within the same firm. However,
these findings can also be explained by information
flow analysis. Hiring associates from similar institu-
tions may lower a firm’s communication costs, as as-
sociates with similar training and thought processes
will be able to transfer their ideas more efficiently.
Put differently, hiring agents from the same or similar
institutions may allow a firm to capitalize on an invest-
ment already made by the educational institutions in
lowering the cost of transferring complex information
between their graduates.
Second, there is evidence that the number of direct
reports to CEOs has increased in recent years (e.g.,
Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010).
Specifically, the breadth (as measured by the number
of direct reports to the CEO) increases, and the depth
(as measured by the number of levels between the
CEO and the highest authority in an individual profit
center within the company) of the company decreases.
A decrease in depth arguably improves the informa-
tion flows between CEO and division managers byCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.eliminating a level of management. Some have argued
that it also increases the ability of the firm to act
quickly to market changes. However, that increase
would come at a cost. Assuming a CEO was operating
at capacity (in terms of time) prior to an increase in
breadth, an increase in breadth must be accompanied
by a decrease in the cost of interacting with each re-
port. One way this could happen is to decrease the
complexity of information transfers between each re-
port and the CEO. This could happen as a company’s
products become more commoditized. Production in
such cases may become a more rote process and re-
quire less complex information transfers between the
leadership and the units themselves, allowing the lead-
ership to take on a more direct role. Consistent with
this, some evidence suggests that as competition in-
creases, breadth increases.285.3. Successive Monopoly Markup
The standard story of vertically related monopolists is
that the sum of the profits they earn is lower than what
they could earn if the monopolists were vertically inte-
grated (double-monopoly markup problem). The stan-
dard response to this is to vertically integrate and
thereby increase both total surplus and the total
profits.29 This solution, however, ignores moral
hazard costs generated by creating a larger firm. If a
vertically related supplier is integrated into its cus-
tomer, the management of that vertically related sup-
plier will not have the same motivation to be efficient
because there is another layer between management
and the residual claimant. These moral hazard costs
could be addressed by an incentive contract at what
has now become a subsidiary, but if the incentive con-
tract is based on the subsidiary’s performance, this
could lead to the same double-monopoly markup prob-
lem that motivated the merger in the first place. The
difference is that now the double-monopoly markup
takes place between internally related monopolists,
but it is no less costly.
The trade-off between the moral hazard costs and
the double-monopoly markup cost is, at least in part,
a trade-off between information costs. Moral hazard
costs are reduced as the information the principal has
about agent behavior increases. Similarly, Jeuland
and Shugan (1988) show that under certain circum-
stances, information about the vertically related firm’s
behavior can lead to across-firm contracting solutions
that reduce the double-monopoly markup problem.
The net benefits of merging in this case will partly
be a function of the cost of transferring informationManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS 397regarding the double-monopoly markup problem
relative to the cost of transferring information about
agent behavior.6. CONCLUSION
Coase (1937) emphasized the benefits of examining
the foundations on which theories rest in his explora-
tion of the firm. In this paper, I argue that a foundation
of the firm is information and that analysis of informa-
tion flows is warranted because of the central role they
play in determining optimal organizational form. In
particular, the benefits of organizing human capital
within a firm increase with the complexity of informa-
tion to be transferred and the number of times those
transfers take place. An examination of other theories
shows that they ultimately rely on an understanding
of information flows, and when those are considered,
the conclusions are more refined and, in some cases,
different.
Although the firm is the central character in this pa-
per, information flow analysis can be extended to ex-
amine other forms of organizations and information-
sharing mechanisms. Teams, another focus of eco-
nomic literature, are one example. Other mechanisms
developed by the market may provide more fertile
ground for organizational research. Toyota’s lean pro-
duction system and GE’s metrics and meeting struc-
ture are just two examples. Breaking these and other
examples down into their component parts—the infor-
mation that is transferred—might provide guidance to
managers as they wrestle with the question of how
best to organize their economic activities.NOTES
1. As is the case with many assets including steel molds
for plastic parts and prints for printed circuit boards.
2. Some form of information flow analysis can be found in
many different disciplines within economics. The eco-
nomic geography literature notes the role of physical
proximity in transferring complex information (Sturgeon
et al., 2008). Economic historians identified something
akin to this years ago (e.g., Buttrick, 1952, Chandler,
1977). Personnel economics (Lazear and Gibbs, 2009)
also considers information flows between individuals in
organizational design.
3. Although the discussion will center on firm boundaries,
I follow Demsetz (1988) in that I am less interested in
whether or not an activity actually takes place within a
firm’s boundaries and treat firm-like activities (e.g.,
long-term repeated across-firm relationships) the same
as within-firm activities. This paper is thus about theCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.desirability of certain types of organizational relation-
ships. Once determined, as Masten (1988) points out,
the legal structure of the firm is an efficient method of
creating one set of relationships in one step. However,
it is not the only option and whether or not a legal firm
is chosen to impose those relationships is a separate
question.
4. Williamson (1985), p. 21.
5. For example, Lafontaine and Slade’s (2007) description
of the transaction cost literature relates incentives to
specificity in the following way: ‘specific investments
generate quasi rents, and each of the parties to a contract
has incentives to endeavor to capture those rents’
(p. 649).
6. Bloom’s taxonomy remains ‘(o)ne of the most widely
used ways of organizing levels of expertise’ (University
of North Carolina’s Center for Teaching and Learning,
Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, as found
on their website in 2013: http://teaching.uncc.edu/arti-
cles-books/best-practice-articles/goals-objectives/
blooms-taxonomy-educational-objectives). Although a
number of theorists have attempted to revise the taxon-
omy, the initial framework remains the standard in
education.
7. Different authors use the word ‘knowledge’ in different
ways. In particular, Bloom’s use of the word knowledge
should not be confused with that of Azoulay (2004)
whose description of knowledge would be much higher
in Bloom’s taxonomy.
8. Note the difference with Tadelis (2002), who concen-
trates on contract complexity instead of information
complexity.
9. Blair and Lafontaine (2005) cite an example of the dif-
ference between employment and contracting in the
context of franchising: ‘in a private conversation with
one of the authors of this book, a franchisor mentioned
how, if he had hired one of his franchisees, he could
never have brought himself to pay him a salary
commensurate with the level of profit that this franchisee
was earning’ (p. 217). This begs the question: why enter
into a franchisee relationship? One answer is that
incentives are stronger when the franchisee is an inde-
pendent business owner where compensation of zero is
a real possibility. Implicit in this argument is a greater
sense of commitment to employment and positive
compensation with an employment contract instead
of a franchise contract. Further, to the extent that an
employer is able to contract with an independent con-
tractor in a way that replicates the commitment from
and to the employee, the employer has created what
Demsetz (1988) calls a ‘firm-like’ relationship, and
the cost-benefit analysis described here applies. That
is, the distinction here is between contracting forms
that are more firm-like and less firm-like, not necessar-
ily between those that are within a firm’s legal bound-
aries and those that are firm-like but just outside a
firm’s boundary.
10. In a related discussion about teams, Lazear and Gibbs
(2009) argue that team interactions will be necessary
when the task requires multiple skills and or a greater
capacity than that of a single individual. However, this
by itself is not enough to explain the existence of teams.Manage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
P. CLYDE398Many products and services require multiple skills, but
not all of those are combined in a team setting. The team
becomes beneficial if those skills need to be integrated
in a way that is accomplished most efficiently via fre-
quent transfers of complex information.
11. See Demsetz (1988).
12. However, within the consulting firm, complex informa-
tion is transferred frequently and over long periods. This
improves the consulting firm’s efficiency with any given
client. On each assignment, the employees of the con-
sulting firm learn more about that specific topic that is
of value because they work on similar projects over
and over again with different clients. The value of this
learning is, however, low to any given client who typi-
cally faces that particular problem less frequently.
13. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) define common agency
as a situation in which actions by one agent affect
multiple principals.
14. See, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
15. Some firms in the pharmaceutical industry actually do
hire customers when the drug treatment and/or the infor-
mation to be gained from the consumer is sufficiently
valuable. Some hemophilia patients, for instance, are
hired as employees of the pharmaceutical company in
part because the pharmaceutical company is trying to
gain a deep understanding of (or complex information
about) the needs of these patients.
16. There are other reasons that vertical integration between
a manufacturer and a retailer would not be beneficial.
For instance, if the manufactured good is most effi-
ciently sold in combination with goods from many other
manufacturers (e.g., grocery stores), integration is not
likely to be a beneficial solution.
17. I do not consider all other theories that rely on incen-
tives (e.g., relational contracts as found in Baker et al.,
2002); however, because information flow analysis rests
on the economies of scale associated with transferring
complex information, it is going to be distinct from all
of these as well. My point here is to explore the implica-
tions of those differences in a few of these literatures.
18. See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a review of the em-
pirical literature supporting the theory.
19. As discussed earlier, this is consistent with Coase
(2006) who does not appear to consider the purchase
of equipment to be vertical integration but instead fo-
cuses on the organization of human capital.
20. The value of integration here is that it is an upfront pay-
ment to the supplier. The supplier is not subject to the
same level of risk of poor market analysis or potential
duplicity.
21. Williamson (1991) discusses a hybrid form of gover-
nance, which, while moving in the direction of integra-
tion in terms of control and incentives, does not move to
the polar case of hierarchy. However, his discussion is
not based on complexity of information and thus differs
from the distinction described here.
22. Klein (1988) may have had complex information flows
in mind in his analysis of the organization of human
capital. He illustrates the benefit of integration in the
context of the Fisher–GM merger: ‘By integrating with
Fisher, General Motors acquired the Fisher Body orga-
nizational capital. This organization is embedded inCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the human capital of the employees at Fisher but is in
some sense greater than the sum of its parts. The em-
ployees come and go but the organization maintains
the memory of past trials and the knowledge of how to
best do something (that is, how to make automobile
bodies)’ (p. 208). The source of the gain to integration—
the organization embedded in the human capital of the
employees—is not entirely clear. However, one possibil-
ity is consistent with information flow analysis: scale
economies associated with complex information flows.
23. See, for example, Williamson’s (2000) discussion.
Other theories, such as Hart (1988) and Grossman and
Hart’s (1986) analysis of asset ownership, do provide
guidance on which party should be the buyer, that is,
which party should end up as the owner of the residual
rights of control.
24. There is a similar effect when capital constraints are
binding. Specifically, even if information flow analysis
suggests party A would acquire party B, if party A has
limited capital, party B may end up purchasing party
A. Another way of looking at it is that party A will need
to raise the capital necessary to buy party B. This re-
quires party A to transfer complex information about
the benefit of integration to an investor. Party B may
be the most efficient source of that capital.
25. At one point, the authors touch on the incentives of the
employees, arguing that employees at major-owned re-
gionals have an incentive to make sure the parent firm
is profitable because if the regional is sold, the em-
ployee might be subject to lower wages as an employee
at an independent regional. However, the link is not
obvious (the regional might be sold because it was
profitable), and the evidence presented suggesting lower
wages for independent regionals applies to pilots—not
to the employees making the relevant decisions.
Further, earlier in the article, Forbes and Lederman state
that the major-owned regionals are kept separate from
the major so they can benefit from the lower-cost struc-
ture that applies to nonunionized workforces. That is, so
they can benefit from the cost structure that the indepen-
dent regionals enjoy. If there is no wage differential, the
employees’ incentive to make sure the parent firm is
profitable no longer exists.
26. They still need the incentive to act on it, but organizing
within the firm lowers the cost of transferring informa-
tion and will therefore improve efficiency, holding in-
centives constant.
27. Garicano et al. do consider different types of information
and the costs of transferring them, but the two types that
they consider and the variation in the cost of information
transfers within those categories do not necessarily cor-
respond with complexity as defined in this paper.
Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) look at information flows from two perspectives:
the cost (to a given individual) of accumulating knowl-
edge and the cost of communicating (between individ-
uals). The lower the cost of communicating, the more
likely there will be specialization of knowledge because
people can be asked to solve problems at a lower cost.
The lower the cost of accumulating knowledge, the more
likely individuals are to gather the information instead of
asking others to solve problems. Information flowManage. Decis. Econ. 36: 384–400 (2015)
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INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS 399analysis makes no distinction between communication
and knowledge accumulation—both are information
transfers.
28. Note that the results in Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) are
based on a sudden exogenous event: elimination of
trade barriers, including tariffs, between the USA and
Canada. Specifically, they find that those industries
most affected by the tariff reduction (with the greatest
tariffs prior to the agreement) had the largest increase
in breadth and largest decrease in depth. One possible
explanation is that liberalization forced CEOs to be-
come more competitive by focusing on the liberalized
products and terminating diversification efforts. Consis-
tent with this explanation, they do find that there was
less diversification after liberalization.
29. See for example, Carlton and Perloff (2005).
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